Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

State of Utah v. Marha Tarnawieki : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Steve Mercer;
Deputy District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Lynn C. McMurray; McMurray; MMurray; Dale and Parkinson; P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Tarnawieki, No. 990225 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2086

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

MARHA TARNAWIECKI,

Case No. 990225-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-108 (1999), IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE SHEILA
McCLEVE, PRESIDING

LYNN C. McMURRAY
McMURRAY, McMURRAY
DALE & PARKINSON, P.C.
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
STEVE MERCER
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney

Attorneys for Appellee

r" a J ^ -.
Uteh Court o*^-k'»*te
DEC 1 6 uwd
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

S T A T E OF

UTAH

FILtU

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Utah Court of Appeals

JAN 1 3 2000
Julia D'AIesandro
Clerk of the Court
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
REED RICHARDS

JAMES R SOPER
Solicitor General

Chief Deputy Attorney General

January 13,2000
Ms. Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re: State v. Tarnawiecki, No. 990225-CA
Dear Ms. D'Alesandro:
The purpose of this letter, and the attached insert to the State's responsive brief in
the above-referenced case, is to explain the origin of a mistaken assertion in the State's
brief, to wit: that defendant failed to include the transcript of the plea hearing in the
record on appeal.
On December 30, 1999, Paulette left a telephone message for me indicating that
the above-referenced transcript was part of the record. Because of the approaching
holiday, I was unable to speak with her until Tuesday, January 4, 2000. At that time she
informed me that the transcript was in an envelope, marked, "Exhibit." Upon receiving
the record, I found the envelope also marked, "Transcript of Change of Plea." Although
I requested the entire record to prepare the State's brief, this item was not given to our
runner, an apparent error for which Paulette has graciously apologized. I prepared the
brief on the mistaken, but reasonable, assumption that I had the entire record. I would
appreciate your inserting a copy of the insert in each of the briefs filed with the Court.
Respectfully

Kenneth A. Bronston
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Lynn C. McMurray

State v. TarnawieckU No. 990225-CA - Insert to State's responsive brief as footnote 3a, at
page 6:

The State mistakenly asserts, above and at page 8, that defendant failed to bring
up the transcript of the plea hearing. The mistake stems from the Court's not supplying
the State with the transcript of the plea hearing ("Tr. of Plea") when the record was first
requested, more fully explained in a letter to the Court, dated January 11, 2000.
The transcript shows that the affidavit was adequately incorporated into the record.
(Tr. of Plea at 2). Thus, defendant was adequately informed of the 30-day period for
filing her motion to withdraw the plea, as argued in the body of this brief.
However, the transcript does not show that the trial court specifically advised
defendant of her right to a speedy trial or of the minimum sentence, as defendant argues
on appeal, although it does indicate that the trial court addressed the factual basis for
defendant's plea (Tr. of Plea at 2). App. Br. at 4-13. Defendant did not raise the court's
failure to discuss her right to a speedy trial or the minimum sentence and only nominally
mentioned the lack of a factual basis in her various memoranda in support of her motion
to withdraw the plea (R. 79, 98). Thus, those claims are waived on appeal. See LeBaron
& Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 1991) (stating that
"mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority is introduced at trial in support of the claim, is . . . insufficient to preserve the
issue for appeal"). More importantly, any deficiencies in the plea cannot detract from the
trial court's primary finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of
defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, as principally argued in this brief.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v .

:

MARHA TARNAWIECKI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 990225-CA
.

•

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of a protective order, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sheila McCleve,
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's untimely motion
to extend the period for moving to withdraw her guilty plea for lack of jurisdiction? "We
review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 'abuse of
discretion' standard, incorporating the 'clearly erroneous' standard for the trial court's
findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430,
433 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)). A court's

determination of its jurisdiction is a conclusion of law which the appellate court reviews
for correctness without deference to the trial court's conclusion. State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d
1203, 1204 (Utah App. 1992) (reviewing court's determination of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant) (citation omitted), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
2. Is the 30-day period for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea constitutional?
This is a question of law which, by concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
the trial court implicitly answered affirmatively. "A constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1999) (citing State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995)). "When
addressing such a challenge, [the appellate] court presumes that the statute is valid, and []
resolvefs] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. Id. (citing Society of
Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993); Mountain States Tel &
Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are attached at
Addendum A:
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101, -110 (1996);
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with violation of a protective order, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999) (Count I), and assault, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999) (Count II) (R. 13). On July 17, 1998, defendant entered into a plea agreement, whereby she pleaded
guilty to violation of a protective order and the assault charge was dismissed (Statement
of Defendant Entering a Guilty Plea, R. 14-15, attached at Addendum B; R. 141). The
trial court sentenced defendant to 365 days in jail, suspending 335 days (R. 26).
On September 17, 1998, sixty-two days after the entry of her guilty plea, defendant
filed a motion to extend the time to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, later
expanding that motion to include a motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea ("motion to
withdraw," R. 32-39, 63-88). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to withdraw, finding that because it was untimely filed the court
lacked jurisdiction under State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), to consider the
merits of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, "Findings and Conclusions," R. 160-62, attached at Addendum C). Defendant
thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 165).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The trial court declined to consider the merits of any of defendant's arguments in
support of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea because it determined that it lacked

3

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999), and Price, 837 P.2d at 582-84.
See Findings and Conclusions, R. 161. Although a detailed statement of background facts
is not necessary to the Court's resolution of defendant's claims on appeal, a brief
statement of facts underlying defendant's charges is presented to place some of the
State's summary responses to defendant's lengthy arguments on appeal in perspective.1
Defendant is a non-resident alien who has lived in Salt Lake City for over eight
years (R. 37, 71). In May, 1998, defendant was involved in a pending divorce and child
custody case with her estranged husband, Mark Grosser (R. 71, 124, 131). On May 18,
1998, defendant discovered that Mr. Grosser planned to remove their six-year-old child,
Sahra, from the state, in violation of a court order (R. 125, 131). Defendant called for
police assistance (R. 178:6). Evidently failing to obtain police assistance, defendant
called her divorce counsel (R. 131). He was not available, but his secretary counseled
defendant that if it were her (the secretary's) child, she would take the child to her home
to prevent itfrombeing removed from the state (R. 68, 125).
Defendant then went to Mr. Grosser's mother's house (R. 121). Although she
claimed that she did not want a confrontation with Mr. Grosser, an altercation ensued (R.
15, 178:15-16). Defendant claimed that Mark Grosser was the aggressor and that in

1

The facts are set out generally as defendant has asserted them in her counsel's
various trial memoranda. However, the State does not vouch for the accuracy of
defendant's rendition of the facts since defendant has never sworn to these facts under
oath, nor did the prosecution or the trial court ever affirm defendant's rendition through
any argument, colloquy, or ruling.
4

kicking him in the buttocks, she was only acting in self-defense (R. 2, 125-26).
Nonetheless, after being charged with assault and violation of a protective order issued on
April 24, 1998, defendant, assisted by her counsel, Robert Archuleta, agreed to plead
guilty on July 17, 1998, sixty-two days after she entered her guilty plea (R. 1-2, 14-15).
The plea affidavit, signed by defendant on July 17, 1998, states: "I understand that I have
the right to withdraw this plea within 30 days of today's date as long as the request is in
writing and for good cause shown" (R. 15).2
Mr. Archuleta knew that defendant was a resident alien, and, before entry of the
guilty plea, referred her to Hakim Ishola, an attorney specializing in immigration law, to
determine the consequences of a conviction on her immigration status (R. 124; 178:7-8).
Defendant asserts that following the entry of her guilty plea she became aware that
violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor, is a deportable offense (R. 37).
Mr. Archuleta acknowledged that although defendant had been advised by Mr. Ishola of
the consequences of a criminal conviction, he did not discuss the matter with Mr. Ishola
before the plea was entered and that he did not know that violation of a protective order
was grounds for deportation (R. 178:29-31, 37). Mr. Archuleta also acknowledged that
he did not think he would have counseled defendant to accept a guilty plea had he been

2

The plea affidavit is dated "July, 1998" (R. 15). However, the parties agree that
the affidavit was signed at the time the trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea, on
July 17, 1998 (R. 157, 160).

5

aware that deportation might result (R. 178:30).3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant filed her extension and withdrawal motions sixty-two days after the
entry of her guilty plea, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999). The plea
affidavit adequately informed defendant of the 30-day requirement for filing her motion
to withdraw. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that under State v. Price, 837
P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of defendant's
motion to withdraw (R. 160-61). On appeal, defendant fails to show that Price should be
overruled. Given the correctness of the court's ruling, this Court need address only those
issues bearing on the jurisdictional basis for the court's ruling. Moreover, defendant has
failed to provide the transcript of the plea hearing as part of the record on appeal, leaving
this court without an adequate record to evaluate defendant's claim that the court did not
strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

3

Defendant asserted that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"),
instituted a deportation proceeding as a result of her violation of the domestic order. Mr.
Lynn McMurray, appearing for defendant as a expert witness at the evidentiary hearing,
testified that defendant "was served with immigration papers." (R. 67; 178:70). However,
no documentary evidence supporting those assertions was ever presented to the trial
court. Cf. Price, 837 P.2d at 584 (refusing to consider argument supported only by "selfserving conjecture," rather than affidavits of witnesses).
6

POINT II
Defendant's claims that section 77-13-6 violates due process and equal protection
under the United States Constitution and the open courts provision of the Utah
Constitution, is inadequately articulated to warrant invalidating the statute. Particularly,
defendant has failed to demonstrate that (1) the requirement to move to withdraw a guilty
plea within thirty days is a breach of a "fundamental" right, (2) the violation of criminal
statute is within the purview of the open courts provision, (3) criminal defendants are
members of a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny of the statute, or that (4) the statute is
not rationally related to the legitimate purpose of deterring prolonged, after-the-fact
motions to withdraw. Additionally, section 77-13-6 expressly provides a defendant
untimely filing a motion to withdraw with access to extraordinary relief through postconviction proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT
LACKED JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF
DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER
GUILTY PLEA
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to withdraw
her guilty plea. In support of her claims, defendant argues that the court failed (1) to
strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
including the requirement to adequately inform her of the time limit for moving to

withdraw a guilty plea, and (2) to find that her counsel was ineffective in failing to
investigate, research, and analyze the case, or to adequately inform her of the
jurisdictional period for moving to withdraw her guilty plea or of the consequences of her
guilty plea on her immigration status. App. Br. at 4-35.
However, because defendant's motion to withdraw was untimely filed and
defendant was adequately informed of the time period for moving to withdraw her guilty
plea, the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction under Price to consider
the merits of defendant's untimely motion to withdraw (R. 160-61). Given the
correctness of the court's ruling, this Court need address only those issues bearing on the
jurisdictional basis for the court's ruling.4 Moreover, defendant has failed to provide the
transcript of the plea hearing in the appellate record, leaving this court without an
adequate record for evaluating defendant's claim that the trial court did not strictly
comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Blubaugh, 904
P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995) (an appellate court will "assume the regularity of the
proceedings below when appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal")
(citing Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749
(Utah 1996).
4

Defendant also challenges the continued viability of State v. McFadden, 884
P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1994), which held that trial counsel is not required to inform the
defendant that a guilty plea might subject him to the collateral consequence of
deportation. Br. App. at 45-49. However, because the trial court correctly determined that
it lacked jurisdiction, the court correctly declined to consider this claim (R. 161).
8

A.

The Plea Affidavit Adequately Informed Defendant of
the 30-Day Period for Moving to Withdraw a Guilty Plea,

In Price, this Court held that the 30-day deadline for moving to withdraw a guilty
plea set out in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) is jurisdictional, so long as the defendant
was warned of that deadline at the time of pleading.5 837 P.2d at 581-84. Therefore, a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be denied whenever a defendant warned of the 30day rule files an untimely motion to withdraw. Defendant claims that because the trial
court did not adequately inform her of the 30-day limit for filing a motion to withdraw her
guilty plea the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw. Br. App. at
28-35.6 The claim is without merit.
At the plea hearing, the trial court did not specifically mention the 30-day
requirement for withdrawing a guilty plea during the colloquy (R. 161). However, the

5

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999), provides:
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Emphasis added].
6

Defendant asserts this claim as an as-applied constitutional violation, stating that
section 77-13-6(2)(b) violates her rights of due process and equal protection under the
State and federal constitutions. App. Br. at 28. However, her argument does not attack
the language of the statute, but rather only the wording of the 30-day notice in the plea
affidavit. App. Br. at 29-35.

9

plea affidavit, which defendant signed, clearly informs her of the 30-day limitation
period. Defendant does not claim that a defendant may not be informed of the 30-day
period in the plea affidavit, not does she argue that the plea affidavit was not properly
incorporated into the acceptance of her guilty plea. See State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 823
(Utah App. 1995) ("c[W]hen plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the record (as
when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant has read, has
understood, and acknowledges all the information contained therein), they may properly
form a part of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance.'") (quoting State v. Magnire, 830
P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991).7 She argues only that the language of the plea affidavit did
not adequately inform her of the 30-day period.
The plea affidavit states: "I understand that I have the right to withdraw this plea
within 30 days of today's date as long as the request is in writing and for good cause
shown" (R. 15). Defendant argues that because the affidavit does not specifically state
that failure to act within 30 days forever extinguishes the right to move to withdraw a
guilty plea, the notice is fatally defective. App. Br. at 30-32. However, the affidavit
essentially conforms to section 77-13-6(2)(b). That section also omits an express warning
that the right to move to withdraw a guilty plea is extinguished if the defendant does not

7

Moreover, as noted above, in the absence of the transcript of the plea hearing,
this Court must presume the regularity of the trial court's having properly incorporated
defendant's affidavit, specially prepared for the entry of her guilty plea, into the plea
proceedings. See Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699.
10

act within the statutory period. At no point does defendant claim that such omission
renders the statute constitutionally void.
Defendant also asserts that the placement and use of the phrase, "as long as," in the
plea affidavit is confusing, connotes something less than the mandatory quality of "shall"
used in section 77-13-6(2)(b). App. Br. at 29-35.
Defendant makes too much of the minor differences between the plea affidavit and
the statute. The word "shall" in section 77-13-6(2)(b) plainly suggests that because the
motion to withdraw must be made within thirty days of the entry of the plea, a motion to
withdraw filed after that time cannot be entertained.8
The plea affidavit too gives clear and sufficient notice that defendant must move to
withdraw her guilty plea within 30 days. The operative language of the affidavit states:
"I understand that I have the right to withdraw this plea within 30 days" as long as
[certain conditions are fulfilled] (R. 15) (emphasis added). The inclusion of the 30-day

8

The language of the plea affidavit conveys the same mandatory message as
section 77-13-6(2)(b). It states that defendant has therightto withdraw her plea within 30
days if certain conditions are met: the request is in writing and "good cause" is shown.
Defendant somewhat tangentially argues that the phrase, "as long as" equates with the
terms, "while," "during," and "until." App. Br. at 31-32. Contrary to this limited
reading, the phrase commonly announces a condition precedent. See Behrens v. Raleigh
Hills Hospital Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983) (claim for punitive damages
preserved "as long as" notice of intent to sue contains a "general statement of the nature
of the claim"); Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary (2nd Spec. Ed. 1996)
(defining "as long as" to mean "provided that," or "since"). Thus, the plea affidavit
informs a defendant that he or she may withdraw the plea if the conditions unrelated to
the time period are met.
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time limit necessarily informs the reader that the conditions of the agreement are to be
fulfilled within the specified time; otherwise, the reference to a specific time period
would be mere surplusage and meaningless, extending the period for acting indefinitely,
in contradiction of the directive's plain language. It also naturally follows that if an act is
directed to be performed only within a certain period, no authorization is given to perform
the act outside that period, and consequently, the right to perform is extinguished. See
Dugal Logging, 988 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (finding lumber company
without right to complete work after the period of contract performance) Cf Richmond
Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 80 S.E.2d 574,
582-83 (Va. 1954) (finding contractual provision limited builder's exposure for faulty
materials or workmanship to only the one year specified after buyer's acceptance of the
work). In sum, the plea affidavit adequately informed defendant that if she did not move
to withdraw her guilty plea within 30 days, she would be barred.9
B.

Defendant Fails to Show that Price Should be Overruled,

As stated, the trial court found that because defendant's motion to withdraw her
guilty plea was not timely filed, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion under

9

Defendant repeatedly asserts that because the trial court failed to adequately
warn her of the time period for moving to withdraw her plea, her right to withdraw is
"forever extinguished, waived and barred." App. Br. at 29, 30, 31, 33, 34. Contrary to
such hyperbole, section 77-13-6(3) provides: "This section does not restrict the rights of
an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Thus, although a
defendant may not be able to withdraw a guilty plea, in a proper case the statute provides
him an avenue to attack the validity of her plea.
12

Price (R. 161). Defendant does not claim that the trial court ruled improperly under
Price. Rather, she argues that Price should be ovenuled because the decision fails to
recognize that rule 11(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, preserves the trial court's
jurisdiction of a defendant's untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. App. Br. at 4243. To succeed, defendant must convince this Court that the Price decision "was
originally erroneous or is not longer sound because oi changing conditions ,md that in wv
good than harm will come from departing from precedent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d
393, 399 (Utah 1994) (quoting J. Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2
Vill. L. Rev. 367, 367 (1957)), cert, denied

U.S.

x

114 S. Ct. 910 (1995). As

follows, defendant has not sustained hci buiden of persuasion.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the Court in Price carefully considered the
impact of rule 11(f) on the jurisdictional language of section 77-13-6(2)(b):
Rule 11(6) provides: "Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6." Therefore, although the language
of section 77-13-6(2)(b) is unconditional, it is subject to an exception
incorporated within Rule 11.
Price, 837 P.2d at 582.10 The Court then compared the language of 77-13-6(2)(b) with
rules 4(a) and 48(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which also luu* been held to l»t

10

The 1993 amendment to rule 11, effective May 1, 1993, revised the subdivision
designations, substituting letters for numbers and vice versa. Amendment Notes to rule
11 (1993). Current rule 11(f) is former rule 11(6), verbatim.
11

jurisdictional. Id. These rules provide 30-day time limitations for filing a notice of
appeal and a petition for writ of certiorari, respectively. The jurisdictional periods of
these rules are also subject to an exception for "excusable neglect or good faith," which
may be grounds to extend the filing time, a parallel to the exception in rule 11(f),
providing that the trial court's failure to warn a defendant of the time limit for filing a
motion to withdraw a plea may be grounds for extending the time to make the motion. Id
The Court concluded: "Like Rules 4 and 48, the unconditional, jurisdictional nature of
section 77-13-6(2)(b)fs filing deadline is not destroyed when read in light of the exception
in Rule 11 allowing that deadline to be extended if a defendant has not been informed of
the thirty-day time period." Id. at 583. Thus, defendant's assertion that "the Price case
does not explain its rationale and is inconsistent with the clear plain meaning of the
statute (77-13-6) and the rule (Rule 11(f))," is plainly mistaken. App. Br. at 43.
Defendant also claims that Price's conclusion, that section 77-13-6 states a
jurisdictional time period, is criticized in James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 572-73 (Utah
App. 1998), cert, denied, James v. Warden, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). App. Br. at 44. In
James, the Court held that the defendant, charged with an offense on which the statute of
limitations had run, could nevertheless plead guilty to the offense. Id. at 573-74. The
Court adopted the view that "a voluntary plea of guilty by a counseled defendant operates
as a waiver of the defense of statute of limitations which is not jurisdictional, but in the
nature of an affirmative defense that must be timely asserted." Id. at 571 (quoting Conerly
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v. State, 607 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Miss. 1992)). In recognizing that the issue was one of
first impression in Utah,, the (. ouil noted, without comment, that Price held that a trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id. at 571
n.3. Plainly, this is not criticism. Moreover, it is not clear, nor does defendant argue, that
the jurisdictional time requirement of section 77-13-6(2)(b) is actually a statute of
limitations, since it is not an "atfian"" in the usual sense since il does not operates for the
benefit of a defendant, but for the court, by bringing finality to actions already
commenced. See James, 965 P.2d at 572 (statutes of limitations protect a defendant from
burden of defending against stale claims) (citing Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785
P.2dl087, 1091 (I Hah 1989)). •

• •

In sum, defendant fails to persuasively argue that Price should be overruled.11

11

In a single sentence, defendant also argues that Price violates the due process,
equal protection, and separation of powers clauses of both the Utah and United States
Constitutions: "If the timeliness issue had been properly addressed in the trial court, that
court would have been without jurisdiction to hear defendant's motion and without a basis
for extending the time for defendant to file his motion." App. Br. at 44 (quoting Price,
837 P.2d at 583). Defendant's challenge is conclusory and unsupported by any legal
authority. It therefore need not be considered. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649,
652 (Utah App. 1997) (declining to rule on claim of constitutional error unsupported by
legal analysis or authority) (citing State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)).
See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The argument shall contain the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented... with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.") (emphasis added).
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POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-13-6 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL - THE STATUTE IS
RATIONALLY RELATED TO ITS PURPOSE AND PROVIDES A
SATISFACTORY REMEDY FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
Defendant claims that section 77-13-6(2)(b) violates due process and equal
protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and the open court's provision of the Utah Constitution because it abridges the
fundamental right of plea criminal defendants, claimed to be a suspect class, to access the
trial courts by unreasonably shortening the period in which to move to withdraw a guilty
plea. App. Br. at 35-37. Because, she claims, the statute involves a fundamental right
and a suspect class, it should be reviewed with strict scrutiny. App. Br. at 36-37.
Defendant's argument fails in every particular.
A.

Defendant has Failed to Adequately Brief
a Legal Predicate for Any of Her Theories.

Due Process
Defendant claims that the limitation of therightto withdraw her guilty plea
constitutes the denial of a fundamental right to access the trial court. App. Br. at 35-36.
However, defendant cites no relevant authority supporting her due process claim. Instead,
defendant cites, without discussion, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149
(1937) (finding double jeopardy not a "fundamental"rightmade applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment) overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.
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Ct. 2056, 2062 (1969), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S l't 1008. HP I «1970)
(requiring that proof of guilt in a criminal case must be "beyond reasonable doubt"). App.
Br. at 36.
Contrary to defendant's conclusory claims, "Utah courts have declared that a
withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, that is left to the trial court's sound
discretion " State v. Brocksmith, 888 P 2ci 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v.
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987), and State v. Thorap, 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah
App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)). In Gallegos, the Utah Supreme
Court emphasized the long history of the rule relegating the withdrawal of a guilty plea to
a privilege at the discretion of the trial court. Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1041 n.6. It logically
follows that if Utah's courts have consistently held that withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a
right, then limiting the time to move to withdraw the plea can hardly involve a
fundamental right. In any case, defendant's failure to cite any relevant authority should
preclude this Court: from considering clt le process as afoundationforher claim.
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 652 (declining to rule on claim of constitutional error unsupported
by legal analysis or authority); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
Finally, section 77-13-6(2)(b) only limits the time period in w hich a motion to
withdraw a plea must be made Section 77-13-6(3) provides: " This section does not
restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." Thus, even if defendant's tardiness precludes relief in the trial court under
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section 77-13-6(2)(b), defendant can still apply for extraordinary relief for the deprivation
of any constitutional violation under subsection (3).
Open Courts Provision
Defendant evidently relies on the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
App. Br. at 37 (citing to Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985),
Condemahn v. University Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), and Utah's "open door
policy"). This Court should also decline to consider defendant's challenge to section 713-6, because under this theory it lacks any legal or substantive development. See
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 652; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). First, defendant fails to cite or
include in her addendum, article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the operative
provision setting forth the right to access the courts.12 Moreover, the plain language of
this provision suggests that it is intended to protect personal property and personal rights
of action in civil matters, rather than the rights of criminal defendants, whose rights are
protected by the immediately following provision. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (captioned
"rights of accused persons"). In fact, article I, section 11, applied innumerable times in

12

Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, captioned "redress of injuries,

provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
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civil litigation, has apparently been applied to only once to a criminal case, well over a
half century ago, which has never been cited for its reference to the open courts provision.
See State ex rel Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 386-87, 49 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah
1935) (summarily dismissing challenge under open courts provision because the defendant
was not prejudiced by the operation of the statute and plamlv had access to the courts in
the i out st of trial).
Even if the open courts provision were applicable, defendant has failed to specify
and apply the test provided by the provision: "This two part test first inquires into whether
a statute abrogating an existing remedy pro > ides han effective and leasonable alternative
remedy/ and second, if no alternative remedy is provided, examines whether the statute
eliminates ca clear social or economic evil' through means that are not unreasonable or
arbitrary." Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Berry, 1X1
P.2d at 680), cert denied, McClellan v. Holden, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994). As noted
above, section 77-13-6(3) provides an avenue for extraordinary relief. Defendant has
omitted any discussion of the remedies provided under rule 65C and misrepresented
alleged impediments to relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§78-35a-101-110(1996). 4p|) Hi at ?H Thus defendant has improperly left to this
Court the burden of constructing her argument under the open courts provision. State v.
Jacoby, 915 P.2d 939, 944 (Utah App. 1999) (declining to consider challenge to
jurisdiction unsupported by legal argument or authority) (citing State v. Bishop, 753 I" Id
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439, 450 (Utah 1988) (,M[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party
may dump the burden of argument and research.M,) (citation omitted)).
Finally, the availability of extraordinary relief distinguishes section
77-13-6(2)(b) from statutes of repose and limitation found unlawful under the open courts
provision because they dramatically reduced or foreclosed any access to trial courts of
record. Compare Berry, 1\1 P.2d at 671, 686 (product liability statute precluded any right
of action for wrongful death after six years); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357-60 (Utah
Governmental Immunity Act applied unrealistic cap in medical malpractice action);
Currier, 862 P.2d at 1372 (inflexible, unreasonably restrictive habeas corpus statute of
limitations precluded all possible relief after three months).
Equal Protection
Defendant asserts that section 77-13-6 violates equal protection. He contends that
the strict scrutiny standard should apply because the statute abridges fundamental rights
and involves a suspect class, and is unjustified by any compelling state interest.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies the general
principle that "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in
different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same."
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 85 S. Ct. 28 (1964)). In State v. Bell, this Court furthered elaborated on the equal
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protection test:
A statute does not offend the constitution merely because in practice it
subjects some persons to disparate treatment which is more oppressive than
others must bear. Were it otherwise, the government would be stripped of
its power to legislate intelligently.
Instead, when classifications are created, the pertinent inquiry for
purposes of equal protection is whether some reasonable nexus exists
between the classification implemented and a valid governmental objective.
Applying these principles, equal protection safeguards are offended only if it
is determined that the subject classification rests upon grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the government's purpose. Since it must be
presumed that the legislative branch acted within its constitutional power in
creating law, despite any inequality which results in its practice, "statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it."'
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). See also Lee v. Gaufin,
867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993) ("'A presumption of constitutionality is extended to statutes
. . . and that presumption is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a classification
created by the statute unless the classification creates an invidious discrimination, or bears
no ratiorial relationship to a legitimate state purpose.'") (quoting JJ.N.P. Co. v. State, 655
P.2d 1133, 1138 (Utah 1982)).
"[I]f the challenged classification does not involve a suspect class or impinge on a
fundamental right, we apply a "rational basis test" under which we will uphold the
classification as long as it is rationally related to a valid legislative purpose." State ex rel.
N.R. v. State, 967 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1998). As noted abo\ e, defendant has failed 1 o
identify an> fundamental right abridged by the statute. Further, defendant has cited no
authority or provided any legal argument in support of her claim that the statute involves a
21

suspect class.13 Therefore, even if the Court were to consider defendant's barely
articulated equal protection claim, only the rational basis test would be applicable. See
also Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that
the rational basis test is generally applied to both due process and equal protection claims
since "both tests seek to ensure, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, that 'legislative
action . . . be rationally related to the accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose'")
(citation omitted).
B.

Defendant Fails to Demonstrate that Section 77-13-6 is Not
Rationally Related to the Purpose of Bringing Finality to Guilty
Plea Proceedings,

Defendant acknowledges that the legislature has a legitimate interest in the finality
of criminal convictions and the preservation of evidence for trial following the withdrawal
of a guilty plea. App. Br. at 39-40. She argues, however, that section 77-13-6(2)(b) is not
rationally related to those purposes because thirty days is not enough time for a defendant

13

A suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis is one 'saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.'" Crawford v. State, 881 P.2d 88, 91
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294 (1973)). See Ross v. Peters, 846 P.2d 1107, 1115 n.
35 (Okl.1993) ("Criminal defendants have not been found by the courts as a 'suspect
class.'"); Peeler v. Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. 1995) ("[W]e note that criminal
defendants are not members of a suspect class.") (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S.
263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059-60 (1973)); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 342
(Tex. Ct. App.) ("Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has recognized criminal
defendants in general as constituting a suspect class."), cert, denied, Dinkins v. Texas,
516 U.S. 832, 116 S. Ct. 106 (1995).
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who maybe incarcerated to discover the inevitable errors thai will occur in the plea
process, and that a lorign period, i.e., six months to a year, would not compromise the
State's evidence. App. Br. at 37-41.14
As noted above, equal protection is violated only if the classification rests upon
grounds "wholly irrelevant" to accomplishing the government's purpose and whete, based
on the presumption of" the: .statute's constitutionality, "fnoj state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it" Bell, 785 P.2d at 398. Defendant's itemization of the statute's
deficiencies does not meet this standard. First, no special knowledge or access to evidence
is required to assess the trial court's compliance with the requirements of rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure \ defendant participates in the trial court's rule 11 colloquy
and, by reference to the written rule, can immediately determine whether or not the trial
court has strictly complied with the rule. To the extent that trial counsel may have a
professional duty to inform his client of the trial court's duty to comply with rule 11, any
breach of that duty resulting in an untimely filing of a motion to withdraw is remedied by
the availability of extraordinary relief. Thus, the 30-day time limitation is not
unconstitutionally unreasonable.
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Defendant also claims that Utah's 30-day withdrawal period is unreasonable
compared with other states and is the shortest in the nation, citing People v. Castaneda,
44 Cal. Rptr.2d 666 (Cal. Ct App. 1995), for a "better view." App. Br. at 40-41. Other
than Castaneda, which, without discussion, relied on a 1927 case requiring only that a
motion to withdraw be "seasonably made," see id. at 670, defendant again fails to cite to
any supporting authority.
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Further, the time limitation is far from "wholly irrelevant" to accomplishing the
statute's purpose. The actual classes created by section 77-13-6 are defendants who plead
guilty and then decide within thirty days to withdraw their pleas, and defendants who do
not have their regrets until more than thirty days later. The classifications so created
reasonably advance the legislative goal of deterring criminal defendants from moving to
withdraw their pleas long after-the-fact.15 Moreover, contrary to defendant's argument,
see App. Br. at 38, extraordinary relief is available on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel without initial recourse through direct appeal, and for any specific
constitutional violation or newly discovered evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a104(1), -106(2) (1996) (providing grounds for extraordinary relief and relieving petitioner
of initial burden of direct appeal to remedy claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
stemming from failure to raise issues that could have been raised at trial). See Currier,
862 P.2d at 1370 ("The writ is considered 'one of the most important of all judicial tools
for the protection of individual liberty,' as it 'has become a procedure for assuring that one
is not deprived of life or liberty in derogation of a constitutional right.'") (quoting Hurst v.
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As a practical matter, deferred proceedings do compromise prosecutions. The
withdrawal of a plea during the statutory period does not merely extend the entire
proceedings by the length of the period, but rather tends to decompose the prosecution's
case and thereby disproportionately prolongs the proceedings - the prosecution must
again contact and reassemble the witnesses and the court must reschedule pretrial
hearings and the trial, all of which might have been accomplished before defendant
entered his plea, but which following the withdrawal of the plea may require considerable
time to reconstruct. The resultant delay could be many months.
24

Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989)).16
In sum, in light of relevant considerations, section 77-11-6 is nol unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /6

day of December, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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In further support of her claim that the 30-day period is unreasonable, defendant
observes that the statute of limitations for post-conviction actions is one year, with an
"interest of justice" exception. App. Br. at 38 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-107
(1996), and State v. Frausto, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). This argument is fully undercut
by section 77-13-6(3), which provides the extraordinary relief defendant claims is
lacking.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Art. I, § 11

Sea 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an iiyury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
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(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
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POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT

78-35a-101. Short title.
This act shall be known as the Tost-Conviction Remedies Act."
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-101, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, 9 1.
Compiler's Notes. — As enacted, this chapter did not contain a Part 2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 235
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies.
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as
provided in Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or
sentence for a criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure; or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-102, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, 8 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-103. Applicability — Effect on petitions.
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107, this
chapter applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1,
1996.
History: C. 1953, 78*35a-103, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, 5 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-104. Grounds for relief — Retroactivity of rule.
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has
been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the

"™—

of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was
revoked in an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through
the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that
was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;
and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the
sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or
Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be
governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-104, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, 9 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-105. Burden of proof.
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The
respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-105, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, fi 5.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief — Exception.
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for
post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on
a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-106, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, 5 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of
the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment
of conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction
over the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ
of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the
entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for
writ of certiorari is filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition
is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse
a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.

78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief - Notice.
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either:
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or
sentencing proceeding as appropriate.
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be
stayed for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will
pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no
action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time
during the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift
the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner.
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence
the petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters
that may be necessary.
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-108, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 235, 6 8.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 235

became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel.
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis.
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require
an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.

78-35a-110. Appeal - Jurisdiction.
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief to the annpllatp M I M V , « ^ — :..^-J--X-

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
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and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997.)
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for postconviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., PostConviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing
a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the
judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion
if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence.
Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not
be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition
shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and
sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered,
together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the
petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the
petitioner's claim to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of
the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated
in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case
number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the
results of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time
for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous
post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner
shall attach to the petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or
sentence; and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument
or citations or discuss authorities in the Detition hut the** mav Ho QPt nut in

(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign
and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who
sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the
normal course.
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated
in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating
either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its
face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(2)' A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired
prior to the filing of the petition.
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading
error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall
return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial postconviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service ofpetitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that
all or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail
upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall, answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time
allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the
motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered
by the court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to
be presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility
where the petitioner is confined.

by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good
cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order
either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or
court records,
(m) Orders; stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be
stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written
notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the
stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that
may be necessary and proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent,
the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department
of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4.7 govern
the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of
Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
(Added effective July 1, 1996.)

ADDENDUM B

Third District Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Printed Name of Defendant

roy/jf^

Case Number

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES
I have received and read or had read to me a copy of the Information which states the crime(s) with
which I am charged. I understand the charges against me. I have no questions about what I am
accused of having done.
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTION RIGHTS
Under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States I have the following rights:
1)

COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge
were to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint
one to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for
the appointed lawyer's service to me.

2)

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Although I can choose to testify if I wish,
I cannot be forced by anyone to take the witness stand and testify or give evidence against
myself. That I choose not to testify cannot be held against me in court.

3)

CONFRONTATION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCUSERS: I have a right to see and
hear in open court the witnesses who give evidence against me. I have, if I represent myself, or
an attorney has, in my behalf, the right to ask questions of those witnesses. I also have the
right to have witnesses who will testify in my behalf subpoenaed or, in other words, called
to court at government expense.

4)

JURY TRIAL: I can choose to have a jury hear the case against me. Any verdict rendered by
a jury, whether it be guilty or not guilty, must be by complete agreement of all jurors.

5)

PRESUMPTION AND PROOF: At trial I am presumed innocent until proven guilty. The
burden of proving me guilty of the crime(s) charged is upon the prosecutor who must prove
each and every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

6)

APPEAL: If I were to be tried and convicted of the crime(s) with which I am charged, I could
appeal from any errors of the law that may have resulted in my conviction. By law, an
appeal must be taken within 30 days of entry of judgment.

I understand each of these constitutional rights. They have been explained to me by the judge or
a lawyer. I have no question about them. I know that I could plead not guilty and exercise all
of the rights listed above. I understand that by entering a plea of guilty, I AM GIVING UP THESE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA
I am admitting that I did commit the crime(s) to which I plead guilty. I convict myself the same
as if I were found guilty by judge or jury. Where more than one crime is involved, sentences may
be imposed one after another, consecutively, or may run at the same time, concurrently. In sentencing me, the judge is not required to follow what any other person recommends. The judge must
impose sentence with the following limits:
OFFENSE

JAIL

FINE

Class A Misdemeanor
Class B Misdemeanor
Class C Misdemeanor
Infraction

0
0
0
0

$0.00 - $2,500.00
$0.00 - $1,000.00
$0.00-$ 750.00
$0.00-$ 500.00

- 365 days
-180 days
- 90 days
- days

PLUS MAXIMUM
85% SURCHARGE

Certain crimes require added fees or other conditions of sentencing. Most often, a maximum of
85% surcharge must be added. Some penalties for certain crimes may be greater, or enhanced, if
there are other convictions for similar crimes. I understand these consequences and have no questions about them.
ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA
Of my own choice, I enter this plea. No force, promises, or threats have been made to get me to
do it. I am not under the influence of alcohol or drugs or anything that would impair my judgment
right now. I have read this document or had it read to me. I understand its contents and adopt each
statement in it as my own. By signing this document I am saying that I ENTER A PLEA OF

GUILTY to: 6£#A?%Vr
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Statement of specific comprising elements of each offense and special terms if applicable (plea
negotiation, no contesj plea, etc.):
y»
*
y
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I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW THIS PLEA WITHIN 30 DAYS OF
TODAY! S DATE AS LONG AS THE REQUEST IS pOtVRITJ&G AND FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN.

fyA /ffr

District Judge
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THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

MARHATARNAWIECKI
Defendant.

Case No. 981909388 MS
Hon. Sheila K. McCleve

The defendant's motion for an extension and withdrawal of her guilty plea came
before this court and the court rendered its oral decision on February 8, 1999, after taking
the matter under advisement on December 29,1998, after an evidentary hearng on that
date. The defendant was represented by attorney Larry Long, who did not proffer any
closing oral argument, and the State of Utah was represented by the District Attorney.
The Court hereby enters findings of fact, conclusions of law and its order as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On July 17,1998, the defendant entered a guilty plea to violation of a protective order, a misdemeanor.
2. The defendant signed a waiver of rights form that stated: "I understand that I
have therightto withdraw this plea within 30 days of today's date as long as the request
is in writing and for good cause shown." Defendant signed said waiver on July 17,1998.
3. On September 17,1998, defendant, through her new lawyer, Larry Long, filed

1

a motion to extend the time to file a motion to withdraw and for a motion to
withdraw her plea.
4. On July 17,1998, the trial court asked the defendant if she had gone over her
constitutional rights with Mr. Archuleta, her former defense lawyer, and if she
understood all of that and the defendant answered "yes".

5. In the colloquy between the court and the defendant on July 17, 1998, the
court never specifically referred to nor mentioned the 30 day rule.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defendant failed to file her motions for extension and withdrawal
within 30 days from the entry of her guilty plea, therefore the trial court has no
jurisdiction to hear the motions. See State v. Price, 837 P. 2d 578 (Utah App.
1992).
2. Since the court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the motions, no
further decision is necessary.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is ordered that
the defendant's motion for an extension to file a motion to withdraw is denied and the
court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the merits of the motion;
guilty plea.

,: jets/i.

Dated: - T * ^ / Q , 1999
Sheila
District

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the law suit, and I
placed a preaddressed, postage prepaid, letter in the U.S. mail, containing a copy of
defendant's written objections to State's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order and her proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order addressed as
follows:
District Attorney
Deputy Stephen Mercer
2001 South State St., Suite S-3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

/7
Dated: February 17, 1999
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Harvey Berman

